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На данной нам страничке вы отыщите технические и нетехнические статьи, управления и остальные ресурсы. Ежели вы совершенно не знакомы с Ethereum, предлагаем начать тут. В дополнение к инфы на данной нам страничке есть много сделанных обществом ресурсов, которые стоит изучить:.
Вы не так давно познакомились с Ethereum? Эти статьи и ресурсы — хорошее начало. Общие разъяснения технологии блокчейн в целом и Ethereum в частности. Умный договор — это просто код, который работает в Ethereum. Он именуется контрактом, поэтому что этот код может контролировать ценные вещи, такие как средства ETH либо остальные цифровые активы. В настоящее время Ethereum употребляет систему доказательства транзакций под заглавием «Доказательство работы».
Она дозволяет сети Ethereum согласовать состояние всей инфы, зарегистрированной в блокчейне Ethereum, а также предотвращает некие виды экономических атак. В ETH 2. Вы сможете больше выяснить о ETH 2. Сеть Ethereum состоит из почти всех узлов, каждый из которых работает на совместимом клиентском программном обеспечении. Более популярны два клиента: Geth написан на Go и Parity написан на Rust. Предпринимается много усилий для увеличения пропускной возможности сети Ethereum методом увеличения ее скорости и общего размера транзакций.
Как правило, их можно поделить на решения уровня 1 и уровня 2. Уровень 1 значит улучшение основного протокола Ethereum. Основной проект — ETH 2. Уровень 2 относится к технологиям, которые построены поверх базисного протокола Ethereum. Они разрешают прирастить пропускную способность без вреда для сохранности. Есть также технологии off-chain, такие как side-chains, которые наращивают масштабируемость за счет некого понижения сохранности.
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КАК ПОМЕНЯТЬ БИТКОИН НА НАЛИЧНЫЕ ДЕНЬГИ
A decentralized data feed. For financial contracts for difference, it may actually be possible to decentralize the data feed via a protocol called " SchellingCoin ". SchellingCoin basically works as follows: N parties all put into the system the value of a given datum eg. Everyone has the incentive to provide the answer that everyone else will provide, and the only value that a large number of players can realistically agree on is the obvious default: the truth.
Smart multisignature escrow. Bitcoin allows multisignature transaction contracts where, for example, three out of a given five keys can spend the funds. Additionally, Ethereum multisig is asynchronous - two parties can register their signatures on the blockchain at different times and the last signature will automatically send the transaction. Cloud computing. The EVM technology can also be used to create a verifiable computing environment, allowing users to ask others to carry out computations and then optionally ask for proofs that computations at certain randomly selected checkpoints were done correctly.
This allows for the creation of a cloud computing market where any user can participate with their desktop, laptop or specialized server, and spot-checking together with security deposits can be used to ensure that the system is trustworthy ie. Although such a system may not be suitable for all tasks; tasks that require a high level of inter-process communication, for example, cannot easily be done on a large cloud of nodes. Other tasks, however, are much easier to parallelize; projects like SETI home, folding home and genetic algorithms can easily be implemented on top of such a platform.
Peer-to-peer gambling. The simplest gambling protocol is actually simply a contract for difference on the next block hash, and more advanced protocols can be built up from there, creating gambling services with near-zero fees that have no ability to cheat.
Prediction markets. Provided an oracle or SchellingCoin, prediction markets are also easy to implement, and prediction markets together with SchellingCoin may prove to be the first mainstream application of futarchy as a governance protocol for decentralized organizations. On-chain decentralized marketplaces , using the identity and reputation system as a base. Thus, if the block interval is short enough for the stale rate to be high, A will be substantially more efficient simply by virtue of its size.
With these two effects combined, blockchains which produce blocks quickly are very likely to lead to one mining pool having a large enough percentage of the network hashpower to have de facto control over the mining process. To solve the second issue of centralization bias, we go beyond the protocol described by Sompolinsky and Zohar, and also provide block rewards to stales: a stale block receives Transaction fees, however, are not awarded to uncles.
Specifically, it is defined as follows:. This limited version of GHOST, with uncles includable only up to 7 generations, was used for two reasons. First, unlimited GHOST would include too many complications into the calculation of which uncles for a given block are valid. Second, unlimited GHOST with compensation as used in Ethereum removes the incentive for a miner to mine on the main chain and not the chain of a public attacker. Because every transaction published into the blockchain imposes on the network the cost of needing to download and verify it, there is a need for some regulatory mechanism, typically involving transaction fees, to prevent abuse.
The default approach, used in Bitcoin, is to have purely voluntary fees, relying on miners to act as the gatekeepers and set dynamic minimums. This approach has been received very favorably in the Bitcoin community particularly because it is "market-based", allowing supply and demand between miners and transaction senders determine the price. The problem with this line of reasoning is, however, that transaction processing is not a market; although it is intuitively attractive to construe transaction processing as a service that the miner is offering to the sender, in reality every transaction that a miner includes will need to be processed by every node in the network, so the vast majority of the cost of transaction processing is borne by third parties and not the miner that is making the decision of whether or not to include it.
Hence, tragedy-of-the-commons problems are very likely to occur. However, as it turns out this flaw in the market-based mechanism, when given a particular inaccurate simplifying assumption, magically cancels itself out. The argument is as follows. Suppose that:. A miner would be willing to process a transaction if the expected reward is greater than the cost.
Note that R is the per-operation fee provided by the sender, and is thus a lower bound on the benefit that the sender derives from the transaction, and NC is the cost to the entire network together of processing an operation. Hence, miners have the incentive to include only those transactions for which the total utilitarian benefit exceeds the cost. However, there are several important deviations from those assumptions in reality:. There is another factor disincentivizing large block sizes in Bitcoin: blocks that are large will take longer to propagate, and thus have a higher probability of becoming stales.
In Ethereum, highly gas-consuming blocks can also take longer to propagate both because they are physically larger and because they take longer to process the transaction state transitions to validate. This delay disincentive is a significant consideration in Bitcoin, but less so in Ethereum because of the GHOST protocol; hence, relying on regulated block limits provides a more stable baseline.
An important note is that the Ethereum virtual machine is Turing-complete; this means that EVM code can encode any computation that can be conceivably carried out, including infinite loops. EVM code allows looping in two ways. Second, contracts can call other contracts, potentially allowing for looping through recursion.
This naturally leads to a problem: can malicious users essentially shut miners and full nodes down by forcing them to enter into an infinite loop? The issue arises because of a problem in computer science known as the halting problem: there is no way to tell, in the general case, whether or not a given program will ever halt.
As described in the state transition section, our solution works by requiring a transaction to set a maximum number of computational steps that it is allowed to take, and if execution takes longer computation is reverted but fees are still paid. Messages work in the same way. To show the motivation behind our solution, consider the following examples:. With this system, the fee system described and the uncertainties around the effectiveness of our solution might not be necessary, as the cost of executing a contract would be bounded above by its size.
Additionally, Turing-incompleteness is not even that big a limitation; out of all the contract examples we have conceived internally, so far only one required a loop, and even that loop could be removed by making 26 repetitions of a one-line piece of code. Given the serious implications of Turing-completeness, and the limited benefit, why not simply have a Turing-incomplete language?
In reality, however, Turing-incompleteness is far from a neat solution to the problem. To see why, consider the following contracts:. Now, send a transaction to A. Thus, in 51 transactions, we have a contract that takes up 2 50 computational steps.
Miners could try to detect such logic bombs ahead of time by maintaining a value alongside each contract specifying the maximum number of computational steps that it can take, and calculating this for contracts calling other contracts recursively, but that would require miners to forbid contracts that create other contracts since the creation and execution of all 26 contracts above could easily be rolled into a single contract.
Another problematic point is that the address field of a message is a variable, so in general it may not even be possible to tell which other contracts a given contract will call ahead of time. Hence, all in all, we have a surprising conclusion: Turing-completeness is surprisingly easy to manage, and the lack of Turing-completeness is equally surprisingly difficult to manage unless the exact same controls are in place - but in that case why not just let the protocol be Turing-complete?
The Ethereum network includes its own built-in currency, ether, which serves the dual purpose of providing a primary liquidity layer to allow for efficient exchange between various types of digital assets and, more importantly, of providing a mechanism for paying transaction fees.
This should be taken as an expanded version of the concept of "dollars" and "cents" or "BTC" and "satoshi". In the near future, we expect "ether" to be used for ordinary transactions, "finney" for microtransactions and "szabo" and "wei" for technical discussions around fees and protocol implementation; the remaining denominations may become useful later and should not be included in clients at this point.
The issuance model will be as follows:. Long-Term Supply Growth Rate percent. Despite the linear currency issuance, just like with Bitcoin over time the supply growth rate nevertheless tends to zero. The two main choices in the above model are 1 the existence and size of an endowment pool, and 2 the existence of a permanently growing linear supply, as opposed to a capped supply as in Bitcoin.
The justification of the endowment pool is as follows. If the endowment pool did not exist, and the linear issuance reduced to 0. Hence, in the equilibrium The organization would also then have 1. Hence, this situation is exactly equivalent to the endowment, but with one important difference: the organization holds purely BTC, and so is not incentivized to support the value of the ether unit.
The permanent linear supply growth model reduces the risk of what some see as excessive wealth concentration in Bitcoin, and gives individuals living in present and future eras a fair chance to acquire currency units, while at the same time retaining a strong incentive to obtain and hold ether because the "supply growth rate" as a percentage still tends to zero over time.
We also theorize that because coins are always lost over time due to carelessness, death, etc, and coin loss can be modeled as a percentage of the total supply per year, that the total currency supply in circulation will in fact eventually stabilize at a value equal to the annual issuance divided by the loss rate eg.
Note that in the future, it is likely that Ethereum will switch to a proof-of-stake model for security, reducing the issuance requirement to somewhere between zero and 0. Creators are free to crowd-sell or otherwise assign some or all of the difference between the PoS-driven supply expansion and the maximum allowable supply expansion to pay for development.
Candidate upgrades that do not comply with the social contract may justifiably be forked into compliant versions. The Bitcoin mining algorithm works by having miners compute SHA on slightly modified versions of the block header millions of times over and over again, until eventually one node comes up with a version whose hash is less than the target currently around 2 However, this mining algorithm is vulnerable to two forms of centralization.
First, the mining ecosystem has come to be dominated by ASICs application-specific integrated circuits , computer chips designed for, and therefore thousands of times more efficient at, the specific task of Bitcoin mining. This means that Bitcoin mining is no longer a highly decentralized and egalitarian pursuit, requiring millions of dollars of capital to effectively participate in.
Second, most Bitcoin miners do not actually perform block validation locally; instead, they rely on a centralized mining pool to provide the block headers. The current intent at Ethereum is to use a mining algorithm where miners are required to fetch random data from the state, compute some randomly selected transactions from the last N blocks in the blockchain, and return the hash of the result.
This has two important benefits. Second, mining requires access to the entire blockchain, forcing miners to store the entire blockchain and at least be capable of verifying every transaction. This removes the need for centralized mining pools; although mining pools can still serve the legitimate role of evening out the randomness of reward distribution, this function can be served equally well by peer-to-peer pools with no central control.
This model is untested, and there may be difficulties along the way in avoiding certain clever optimizations when using contract execution as a mining algorithm. However, one notably interesting feature of this algorithm is that it allows anyone to "poison the well", by introducing a large number of contracts into the blockchain specifically designed to stymie certain ASICs.
The economic incentives exist for ASIC manufacturers to use such a trick to attack each other. Thus, the solution that we are developing is ultimately an adaptive economic human solution rather than purely a technical one. One common concern about Ethereum is the issue of scalability.
Like Bitcoin, Ethereum suffers from the flaw that every transaction needs to be processed by every node in the network. With Bitcoin, the size of the current blockchain rests at about 15 GB, growing by about 1 MB per hour. Ethereum is likely to suffer a similar growth pattern, worsened by the fact that there will be many applications on top of the Ethereum blockchain instead of just a currency as is the case with Bitcoin, but ameliorated by the fact that Ethereum full nodes need to store just the state instead of the entire blockchain history.
The problem with such a large blockchain size is centralization risk. If the blockchain size increases to, say, TB, then the likely scenario would be that only a very small number of large businesses would run full nodes, with all regular users using light SPV nodes. In such a situation, there arises the potential concern that the full nodes could band together and all agree to cheat in some profitable fashion eg.
Light nodes would have no way of detecting this immediately. In the case of Bitcoin, this is currently a problem, but there exists a blockchain modification suggested by Peter Todd which will alleviate this issue. In the near term, Ethereum will use two additional strategies to cope with this problem. First, because of the blockchain-based mining algorithms, at least every miner will be forced to be a full node, creating a lower bound on the number of full nodes.
Second and more importantly, however, we will include an intermediate state tree root in the blockchain after processing each transaction. Even if block validation is centralized, as long as one honest verifying node exists, the centralization problem can be circumvented via a verification protocol.
If a miner publishes an invalid block, that block must either be badly formatted, or the state S[n] is incorrect. Since S is known to be correct, there must be some first state S[i] that is incorrect where S[i-1] is correct. Nodes would be able to use those nodes to run that part of the computation, and see that the S[i] generated does not match the S[i] provided.
Another, more sophisticated, attack would involve the malicious miners publishing incomplete blocks, so the full information does not even exist to determine whether or not blocks are valid. The solution to this is a challenge-response protocol: verification nodes issue "challenges" in the form of target transaction indices, and upon receiving a node a light node treats the block as untrusted until another node, whether the miner or another verifier, provides a subset of Patricia nodes as a proof of validity.
The Ethereum protocol was originally conceived as an upgraded version of a cryptocurrency, providing advanced features such as on-blockchain escrow, withdrawal limits, financial contracts, gambling markets and the like via a highly generalized programming language. The Ethereum protocol would not "support" any of the applications directly, but the existence of a Turing-complete programming language means that arbitrary contracts can theoretically be created for any transaction type or application.
What is more interesting about Ethereum, however, is that the Ethereum protocol moves far beyond just currency. Protocols around decentralized file storage, decentralized computation and decentralized prediction markets, among dozens of other such concepts, have the potential to substantially increase the efficiency of the computational industry, and provide a massive boost to other peer-to-peer protocols by adding for the first time an economic layer. Finally, there is also a substantial array of applications that have nothing to do with money at all.
The concept of an arbitrary state transition function as implemented by the Ethereum protocol provides for a platform with unique potential; rather than being a closed-ended, single-purpose protocol intended for a specific array of applications in data storage, gambling or finance, Ethereum is open-ended by design, and we believe that it is extremely well-suited to serving as a foundational layer for a very large number of both financial and non-financial protocols in the years to come.
Ethereum, like many community-driven, open-source software projects, has evolved since its initial inception. Help update this page. Translate page. See English. What is ether ETH? Use Ethereum. Search away! Introduction to Bitcoin and Existing Concepts History The concept of decentralized digital currency, as well as alternative applications like property registries, has been around for decades.
Bitcoin As A State Transition System From a technical standpoint, the ledger of a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin can be thought of as a state transition system, where there is a "state" consisting of the ownership status of all existing bitcoins and a "state transition function" that takes a state and a transaction and outputs a new state which is the result.
If the provided signature does not match the owner of the UTXO, return an error. The algorithm for checking if a block is valid, expressed in this paradigm, is as follows: Check if the previous block referenced by the block exists and is valid.
Check that the timestamp of the block is greater than that of the previous block fn. Let S be the state at the end of the previous block. For all i in Return true, and register S[n] as the state at the end of this block. Merkle Trees Left: it suffices to present only a small number of nodes in a Merkle tree to give a proof of the validity of a branch. Alternative Blockchain Applications The idea of taking the underlying blockchain idea and applying it to other concepts also has a long history.
Namecoin - created in , Namecoin is best described as a decentralized name registration database. Ideally, one would like to be able to have an account with a name like "george". However, the problem is that if one person can create an account named "george" then someone else can use the same process to register "george" for themselves as well and impersonate them.
The only solution is a first-to-file paradigm, where the first registerer succeeds and the second fails - a problem perfectly suited for the Bitcoin consensus protocol. Namecoin is the oldest, and most successful, implementation of a name registration system using such an idea.
Colored coins - the purpose of colored coins is to serve as a protocol to allow people to create their own digital currencies - or, in the important trivial case of a currency with one unit, digital tokens, on the Bitcoin blockchain. In the colored coins protocol, one "issues" a new currency by publicly assigning a color to a specific Bitcoin UTXO, and the protocol recursively defines the color of other UTXO to be the same as the color of the inputs that the transaction creating them spent some special rules apply in the case of mixed-color inputs.
This allows users to maintain wallets containing only UTXO of a specific color and send them around much like regular bitcoins, backtracking through the blockchain to determine the color of any UTXO that they receive. This provides an easy mechanism for creating an arbitrary cryptocurrency protocol, potentially with advanced features that cannot be implemented inside of Bitcoin itself, but with a very low development cost since the complexities of mining and networking are already handled by the Bitcoin protocol.
Metacoins have been used to implement some classes of financial contracts, name registration and decentralized exchange. Scripting Even without any extensions, the Bitcoin protocol actually does facilitate a weak version of a concept of "smart contracts". However, the scripting language as implemented in Bitcoin has several important limitations: Lack of Turing-completeness - that is to say, while there is a large subset of computation that the Bitcoin scripting language supports, it does not nearly support everything.
The main category that is missing is loops. This is done to avoid infinite loops during transaction verification; theoretically it is a surmountable obstacle for script programmers, since any loop can be simulated by simply repeating the underlying code many times with an if statement, but it does lead to scripts that are very space-inefficient.
For example, implementing an alternative elliptic curve signature algorithm would likely require repeated multiplication rounds all individually included in the code. Value-blindness - there is no way for a UTXO script to provide fine-grained control over the amount that can be withdrawn. This would require an oracle to determine the value of 1 BTC in USD, but even then it is a massive improvement in terms of trust and infrastructure requirement over the fully centralized solutions that are available now.
However, because UTXO are all-or-nothing, the only way to achieve this is through the very inefficient hack of having many UTXO of varying denominations eg. Lack of state - UTXO can either be spent or unspent; there is no opportunity for multi-stage contracts or scripts which keep any other internal state beyond that.
This makes it hard to make multi-stage options contracts, decentralized exchange offers or two-stage cryptographic commitment protocols necessary for secure computational bounties. It also means that UTXO can only be used to build simple, one-off contracts and not more complex "stateful" contracts such as decentralized organizations, and makes meta-protocols difficult to implement.
Binary state combined with value-blindness also mean that another important application, withdrawal limits, is impossible. Blockchain-blindness - UTXO are blind to blockchain data such as the nonce, the timestamp and previous block hash. This severely limits applications in gambling, and several other categories, by depriving the scripting language of a potentially valuable source of randomness.
Ethereum The intent of Ethereum is to create an alternative protocol for building decentralized applications, providing a different set of tradeoffs that we believe will be very useful for a large class of decentralized applications, with particular emphasis on situations where rapid development time, security for small and rarely used applications, and the ability of different applications to very efficiently interact, are important.
Ethereum Accounts In Ethereum, the state is made up of objects called "accounts", with each account having a byte address and state transitions being direct transfers of value and information between accounts. Messages and Transactions The term "transaction" is used in Ethereum to refer to the signed data package that stores a message to be sent from an externally owned account.
Transactions contain: The recipient of the message A signature identifying the sender The amount of ether to transfer from the sender to the recipient An optional data field A STARTGAS value, representing the maximum number of computational steps the transaction execution is allowed to take A GASPRICE value, representing the fee the sender pays per computational step The first three are standard fields expected in any cryptocurrency.
Messages Contracts have the ability to send "messages" to other contracts. A message contains: The sender of the message implicit The recipient of the message The amount of ether to transfer alongside the message An optional data field A STARTGAS value Essentially, a message is like a transaction, except it is produced by a contract and not an external actor. If not, return an error. If there is not enough balance to spend, return an error. If the receiving account does not yet exist, create it.
Otherwise, refund the fees for all remaining gas to the sender, and send the fees paid for gas consumed to the miner. The process for the state transition function in this case is as follows: Check that the transaction is valid and well formed. Run the code. Code Execution The code in Ethereum contracts is written in a low-level, stack-based bytecode language, referred to as "Ethereum virtual machine code" or "EVM code". Unlike stack and memory, which reset after computation ends, storage persists for the long term.
Blockchain and Mining The Ethereum blockchain is in many ways similar to the Bitcoin blockchain, although it does have some differences. The basic block validation algorithm in Ethereum is as follows: Check if the previous block referenced exists and is valid. Check that the timestamp of the block is greater than that of the referenced previous block and less than 15 minutes into the future Check that the block number, difficulty, transaction root, uncle root and gas limit various low-level Ethereum-specific concepts are valid.
Check that the proof-of-work on the block is valid. If it is, the block is valid; otherwise, it is not valid. Applications In general, there are three types of applications on top of Ethereum. Token Systems On-blockchain token systems have many applications ranging from sub-currencies representing assets such as USD or gold to company stocks, individual tokens representing smart property, secure unforgeable coupons, and even token systems with no ties to conventional value at all, used as point systems for incentivization.
The basic code for implementing a token system in Serpent looks as follows: def send to, value : if self. Financial derivatives and Stable-Value Currencies Financial derivatives are the most common application of a "smart contract", and one of the simplest to implement in code. Given that critical ingredient, the hedging contract would look as follows: Wait for party A to input ether. Wait for party B to input ether.
Identity and Reputation Systems The earliest alternative cryptocurrency of all, Namecoin , attempted to use a Bitcoin-like blockchain to provide a name registration system, where users can register their names in a public database alongside other data.
Here is the basic contract to provide a Namecoin-like name registration system on Ethereum: def register name, value : if! Decentralized File Storage Over the past few years, there have emerged a number of popular online file storage startups, the most prominent being Dropbox, seeking to allow users to upload a backup of their hard drive and have the service store the backup and allow the user to access it in exchange for a monthly fee.
In a simple implementation of such a DAO contract, there would be three transaction types, distinguished by the data provided in the transaction: [0,i,K,V] to register a proposal with index i to change the address at storage index K to value V [1,i] to register a vote in favor of proposal i [2,i] to finalize proposal i if enough votes have been made The contract would then have clauses for each of these. Further Applications 1. Alice and Bob together can withdraw anything.
It cannot be an ancestor of B An uncle must be a valid block header, but does not need to be a previously verified or even valid block An uncle must be different from all uncles included in previous blocks and all other uncles included in the same block non-double-inclusion For every uncle U in block B, the miner of B gets an additional 3. Fees Because every transaction published into the blockchain imposes on the network the cost of needing to download and verify it, there is a need for some regulatory mechanism, typically involving transaction fees, to prevent abuse.
Suppose that: A transaction leads to k operations, offering the reward kR to any miner that includes it where R is set by the sender and k and R are roughly visible to the miner beforehand. An operation has a processing cost of C to any node ie. However, there are several important deviations from those assumptions in reality: The miner does pay a higher cost to process the transaction than the other verifying nodes, since the extra verification time delays block propagation and thus increases the chance the block will become a stale.
There do exist nonmining full nodes. The mining power distribution may end up radically inegalitarian in practice. Speculators, political enemies and crazies whose utility function includes causing harm to the network do exist, and they can cleverly set up contracts where their cost is much lower than the cost paid by other verifying nodes. Specifically: blk. Computation And Turing-Completeness An important note is that the Ethereum virtual machine is Turing-complete; this means that EVM code can encode any computation that can be conceivably carried out, including infinite loops.
To show the motivation behind our solution, consider the following examples: An attacker creates a contract which runs an infinite loop, and then sends a transaction activating that loop to the miner. The miner will process the transaction, running the infinite loop, and wait for it to run out of gas. Even though the execution runs out of gas and stops halfway through, the transaction is still valid and the miner still claims the fee from the attacker for each computational step.
An attacker creates a very long infinite loop with the intent of forcing the miner to keep computing for such a long time that by the time computation finishes a few more blocks will have come out and it will not be possible for the miner to include the transaction to claim the fee. However, the attacker will be required to submit a value for STARTGAS limiting the number of computational steps that execution can take, so the miner will know ahead of time that the computation will take an excessively large number of steps.
An attacker sees a contract with code of some form like send A,contract. The contract author does not need to worry about protecting against such attacks, because if execution stops halfway through the changes get reverted. A financial contract works by taking the median of nine proprietary data feeds in order to minimize risk. An attacker takes over one of the data feeds, which is designed to be modifiable via the variable-address-call mechanism described in the section on DAOs, and converts it to run an infinite loop, thereby attempting to force any attempts to claim funds from the financial contract to run out of gas.
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Ethereum generation биткоин как заработать с нуля пошаговаяWhat is Ethereum? Ethereum 2.0 Explained
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